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Abstract
Different qualitative models have been proposed for decision under uncertainty in Artificial In-
telligence, but they generally fail to satisfy the principle of strict Pareto dominance or principle
of “efficiency”, in contrast to the classical numerical criterion—expected utility. Among the most
prominent examples of qualitative models are the qualitative possibilistic utilities (QPU) and the or-
der of magnitude expected utilities (OMEU). They are both appealing but inefficient in the above
sense. The question is whether it is possible to reconcile qualitative criteria and efficiency. The
present paper shows that the answer is yes, and that it leads to special kinds of expected utilities.
It is also shown that although numerical, these expected utilities remain qualitative: they lead to dif-
ferent decision procedures based on min, max and reverse operators only, generalizing the leximin
and leximax orderings of vectors.
 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction and motivation
A decision-making problem under uncertainty is a 4-tuple (S,X,A,), where S is
a set of states of nature, X a set of consequences, A = XS the set of possible acts (in
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246 H. Fargier, R. Sabbadin / Artificial Intelligence 164 (2005) 245–280decision under uncertainty, an act is a function f :S → X) and  is a preference relation
on A, usually complete and transitive (i.e., is a complete preorder). In this case, ∼ is the
equivalence relation associated to  (∀f,g ∈ A, f ∼ g ⇔ f  g and g  f ), and 	 the
strict preference relation associated to  (f 	 g ⇔ f  g and not g  f ).
A numerical approach is classically advocated (see, e.g., [25]) for encoding both the
information pertaining to the state of nature and the preferences on X: uncertainty is repre-
sented by a probability distribution p over S and preference is encoded by a utility function
u :X → [0,1].1 The four-tuple 〈S,X,p,u〉 will be called a probabilistic utility model, PU-
model for short. Acts are then ranked according to their expected utility EUp,u (written
here in the finite setting):
f EU,p,u g ⇔ EUp,u(f ) EUp,u(g)
where, ∀h ∈A EUp,u(h) =∑s∈S p(s) · u(h(s)).
Information about preference and uncertainty in decision problems cannot always be
quantified in a simple way, but only qualitative evaluations can sometimes be attained. As
a consequence, the topic of qualitative decision theory is a natural one to consider [5,6,9–
11,16,18,23]. Giving up the quantification of utility and uncertainty has led to give up the
expected utility (EU) criterion as well: the principle of most theories of qualitative decision
making is to model uncertainty by an ordinal plausibility relation on events and preference
by a complete preordering on consequences. In [9,11] two qualitative criteria based on
possibility theory, an optimistic and a pessimistic one, are proposed and axiomatized whose
definitions only require a finite ordinal scale L = {0L < · · · < 1L} for evaluating both
utility and plausibility:
Definition 1. A qualitative possibilistic utility model (QPU-model) is a 5-tuple 〈S,X,L,
π,µ〉 where π :S → L is a normalized possibility distribution and µ :X → L is a utility
function over X.
We will assume S, X and L to be finite (N will denote the cardinality of S in the
following), as it is generally the case in qualitative decision making. Let us call Lµ (resp.
Lπ ) the set of utility (resp. possibility) levels:
Definition 2.
Lµ =
{
α ∈ L,∃x ∈ X,µ(x) = α},
Lπ =
{
β ∈ L,∃s ∈ S,π(s) = β}.
In the following, we rank Lµ = (α0 > · · · > αi > · · · > αk) and Lπ = (β0 > · · · > βi >
· · · > βk′).
It can be assumed without loss of generality that Lπ ⊆ Lµ = L: if it is not the case,
suitable consequences can be added to X. x⊥ and x will denote the two consequences
1 Since expected utility is not sensitive to linear transformations of u, the choice of [0,1] as the range for u is
made for convenience.
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Card({s,π(s) = αi}) denotes the cardinality of each level in the possibility distribution.
In the literature, it is often assumed that Lπ = Lµ, i.e., that each ni is positive, but this
restriction is not necessary. However, since π is normalized, there is at least one state of
possibility 1L, so that maxLπ = maxLµ = 1L. Let one of them be denoted s.
In this context, the possibilistic utilities are defined by:
f OPT,π,µ g ⇔ UOPT,π,µ(f )UOPT,π,µ(g),
where ∀h,UOPT,π,µ(h) = maxs∈S min(π(s),µ(h(s)))
f PES,π,µ g ⇔ UPES,π,µ(f )UPES,π,µ(g),
where ∀h,UPES,π,µ(h) = mins∈S max(n(π(s)),µ(h(s))) and n :L → L is the order revers-
ing function of L.
The value UPES,π,µ(f ) is high only if f gives good consequences in every “rather plau-
sible” state. This criterion is often presented as a generalization of Wald’s criterion, which
estimates the utility of an act by that of its worst possible consequence. UPES,π,µ is thus
“pessimistic” or “cautious”, the pessimism being moderated by taking relative possibilities
of states into account. On the other hand, UOPT,π,µ is often viewed as a mild version of the
maximax criterion which is “optimistic”, or “adventurous”.
Although appealing from a qualitative point of view, possibilistic utilities suffer from
a lack of decisiveness, called the “drowning effect”, due to the use of idempotent
operations—max and min. In particular, when two acts give an identical and extreme (ei-
ther good or bad) consequence in some plausible state, they may be undistinguished by
these criteria, although they may give significantly different consequences in the other
states. As a consequence the principle of strict Pareto dominance is not satisfied. That is,
it may be the case that ∀s,µ(f (s))  µ(g(s)) and that ∃s∗,π(s∗) > 0 and µ(f (s∗)) >
µ(g(s∗)) but g  f .
Example 1. Let S = {s1, s2}, L = {0,1,2,3,4,5}. Let f and g be two acts whose utilities
in states s1 and s2 are listed below, as well as the possibility degrees of the states. One can
check that UOPT,π,µ(f ) = UOPT,π,µ(g) = 3 and UPES,π,µ(f ) = UPES,π,µ(g) = 3 although
f strictly dominates g (µ(f (s1)) = µ(g(s1)) and f has a better consequence in s2).
s1 s2
µ(f ) 3 4
µ(g) 3 1
π 5 2
Most of the qualitative approaches [5,11,16,23], fail to satisfy the principle of strict Pareto
dominance. But this is not the case within expected utility theory, since this model obeys
the following Sure-Thing Principle (STP) that insures that identical consequences do not
influence the relative preference between two acts:
STP: ∀f,g,h,h′, fAh  gAh ⇔ fAh′  gAh′,
where fAh denotes the act identical to f on A ⊆ S and to h on S \A. When  is complete
and transitive, the principle of strict Pareto dominance is a direct consequence of the STP.
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it possible to benefit from the STP and satisfy the strict Pareto principle? Unfortunately, it
can easily be shown that this is generally not possible:
Proposition 1. Let 〈S,X,L,π,µ〉 be a QPU model.
OPT,π,µ (or PES,π,µ) satisfies the STP
⇔ ∃! s∗: π(s∗) = 1L and ∀s = s∗,π(s) = 0L.
This means that possibilistic decision criteria cannot obey the STP, except in a very
particular case: when the actual state of the world is known, i.e., when there is no uncer-
tainty at all! So, we cannot stay in the pure QPU framework and escape the drowning effect
altogether.
The drowning effect has a less known consequence than the inability of the criterion to
satisfy the strict Pareto principle—we will see that, paradoxically, two acts can receive the
same utility in situations where Wald’s principle would make a difference. This less known
effect is due to the use of an idempotent operation to aggregate the plausibility of a state
(or in the pessimistic case, its surprise degree) with its utility, e.g., the min operator in the
UOPT criterion, as can be seen in the following example:
Example 2. Let us take the following QPU model, where S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, L =
{0,1,2,3,4,5}.
s1 s2 s3 s4
µ(f ) 1 1 1 5
µ(g) 2 2 2 5
µ(f ′) 5 5 5 0
µ(g′) 4 4 4 0
π 3 3 3 5
When comparing f and g with the pessimistic criterion, the most plausible state (s4) does
not play any role in the comparison of f and g because it receives the same, preferred
reward for both acts. Wald’s criterion could then be applied on the set of decisive states,
namely S \ {s4}, since these remaining states are equi-plausible. It would then decide that
g is strictly better than f . But both acts paradoxically have the same pessimistic utility
(UPES(f ) = UPES(g) = 2). Their utility degrees on the set of decisive states (1 for f and 2
for g) are actually not taken into account, but are masked by the low surprise degree of the
decisive states (n(π) = 2).
The same behavior obviously appears is the optimistic case. When comparing f ′ and
g′ with the optimistic criterion, the most plausible state (s4) does not play any role in
the comparison of f and g because it receives the worst consequence in both cases. The
optimistic maximax criterion could then be applied on the decisive states that are equi-
plausible, and would decide that f ′ is better than g′. But UOPT(f ′) = UOPT(g′) = 3 since
the utilities on the decisive states (5 for f ′ and 4 for g′) are masked by their low possibility
degree (π = 3).
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to what is generally claimed, it is intuitively hard to say that UPES is a generalization of
Wald’s criterion, or that UOPT is a generalization of the maximax optimistic rule. Let us
give some definitions.
First, a constant act fx : ∀s ∈ S,fx(s) = x can be classically defined for any x ∈ X and
yields a preference relation on X, whatever , preference relation on A:
Definition 3 (Preference on consequences). Let  be a complete and transitive preference
relation on A. X on X is defined by
∀x, y ∈ X, x X y ⇔ fx  fy.
The reader can check that X can be identified with the preference modeled by µ (resp.
u) in a QPU model (resp. a probabilistic model). More generally, since  is complete and
transitive, X is also complete and transitive.
Then, for any complete and transitive preference relation  on A, we can define an
equivalence relation on states, as:
Definition 4 (Equi-plausibility of states). Two states s and s′ are equi-plausible w.r.t.
 iff for any pair of consequences (x, y) ∈ X × X and any act h ∈ A, x{s}(y{s′}h) ∼
y{s}(x{s′}h).
The reader can check that equi-plausibility is an equivalence relation and that equi-
probability is recovered for EU,p,u and equi-possibility for PES,π,µ and OPT,π,µ.
Then, let us define an additional, very weak property on preference relations on acts:
Definition 5 (Weak Pareto principle). Let  be a complete and transitive preference re-
lation on A = XS and X the associated preference relation on X.  satisfies the weak
Pareto principle if and only if
∀f,g ∈A, [∀s ∈ S,f (s) X g(s)] ⇒ f  g.
The weak Pareto principle specifies that if an act f gives consequences as good as g
whatever the state of nature, g should not be strictly preferred to f . This property is indeed
very natural and satisfied by most known decision criteria.
Now, let  be a preference relation on A, complete, transitive and satisfying the weak
Pareto principle. Let X be the induced preference relation on X. Let also x⊥ and x be
the least and most preferred elements of X w.r.t. X , respectively. They do exist since we
know that X is complete and transitive, and X is finite. The following proposition holds:
Proposition 2. Let  be a preference relation on A, complete, transitive and satisfying the
weak Pareto principle. Then,
fx  f  fx⊥ , ∀f ∈A.
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the weak Pareto principle. In the following, x (resp. x⊥) will denote indifferently the most
(resp. least) preferred consequence of X and the constant act fx (resp. fx⊥ ).
We are now equipped to generalize Wald’s principle to decision under uncertainty. Let
 be any preference relation on A, complete, transitive and satisfying the weak Pareto
principle. We define the following optimistic and pessimistic generalisations of Wald prin-
ciple:
Definition 6 (Optimism and Pessimism principles). Let  be any preference relation on A,
complete, transitive and satisfying the weak Pareto principle.
 is pessimistic in the sense of Wald iff for any set A ⊆ S of equi-plausible states,
f >maximin,A g ⇒ fAx 	 gAx;
 is optimistic in the sense of Wald iff for any set A ⊆ S of equi-plausible states,
f >maximax,A g ⇒ fAx⊥ 	 gAx⊥,
where
f >maximin,A g ⇔ ∃s∗ ∈ A,∀s ∈ A,f (s) 	X g(s∗),
f >maximax,A g ⇔ ∃s∗ ∈ A,∀s ∈ A,f (s∗) 	X g(s).
Example 3. Let us set S = {s1, s2}, L = {0,1,2,3,4}, π(s1) = 1 and π(s2) = 4. Let also
A = {s1}. Furthermore, let us consider µ,f and g such that:
• µ(f (s1)) = 4,µ(f (s2)) = 2,
• µ(g(s1)) = µ(g(s2)) = 3.
We have f >maximax,A g since µ(f (s1)) > µ(g(s1)). But, UOPT,π,µ(fAx⊥) = 1 =
UOPT,π,µ(gAx⊥), so OPT,π,µ is not optimistic.
If we now define π ′ such that π ′(s1) = 4 and π ′(s2) = 1, we have f >maximin,A g since
µ(f (s1)) > µ(g(s1)). But, UPES,π ′,µ(fAx) = 3 = UPES,π ′,µ(gAx), so PES,π ′,µ is not
pessimistic.
For a positive example, consider a variation of the previous case replacing π by a
distribution π ′′ in which all the states would be totally possible (π ′′ = 1L = 4). Then
∀h,UPES,π ′′,µ(h) = minsµ(h(s)) and UOPT,π ′′,µ(h) = maxsµ(h(s)): OPT,π ′,µ is opti-
mistic and PES,π ′,µ is pessimistic in the sense of Wald.
Hence, possibilistic utilities do not apply the principles of pessimism or optimism, ex-
cept in one case at least, the case of total ignorance. Making a step further an impossibility
theorem can be stated:
Proposition 3. Let 〈S,X,L,π,µ〉 be a QPU model.
OPT,π,µ is optimistic (or PES,π,µ pessimistic) ⇔ ∀s: π(s) = 1L.
In summary, possibilistic decision criteria cannot aim at generalizing the qualitative
principles, except in situations of total ignorance, nor can they obey the STP, except in the
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effect altogether, or satisfy Wald’s principles.
The idea is then to cope with these difficulties by proposing refinements of the possi-
bilistic criteria that obey the Sure Thing Principle and that are in accordance with Wald’s
principles. The idea of refining QPU first appeared in [10]: the principle was to break ties
with an extra criterion (e.g., refining the pessimistic QPU by the optimistic QPU or by
another ordinal criterion aggregation). However, in [10] the use of a max operator kept the
approach in an ordinal framework, but prevented the full satisfaction of the STP. Since we
are looking for complete and transitive relations it is more natural to think of refinements
based on expected utility. Savage has indeed shown that, as soon as a complete preorder
is desired that satisfies the STP and some very natural axioms, the EU criterion is almost
unavoidable. So, the new question is: are there any expected utility criteria that refine the
possibilistic criteria?
This paper shows that yes, any possibilistic model can be refined by an expected utility;
details are given in Section 2. Moreover, although numerical, these expected utility criteria
can follow the principle of optimism (resp. pessimism) and thus remain qualitative. Sec-
tion 3 indeed explains how they lead to a decision procedure based solely on min, max
and reverse operators—these new procedures generalize well known leximin and leximax
decision procedures. So, the kind of expected utility that is at work is very special: the
“qualitative” probability measure and utility functions that underly it are studied in Sec-
tion 4 under the light of related work. Finally, in Section 5 we show that other qualitative
decision models can be refined by an expected utility criterion. In particular, we will carry
out the same reasoning on the OMEU model initially proposed by [23] and developed by
several other authors.
2. Expected utility refinements of qualitative possibilistic utilities
When considering the optimistic (resp. pessimistic) criterion, we are looking for a prob-
ability distribution p and a utility function u such that EU,p,u refines OPT,π,µ (resp.
PES,π,µ). Recall that a refinement ′ of a relation  is a relation perfectly compatible
with  (it agrees with  when  provides a strict preference) which can break ties by
setting f 	′ g for some f,g that are indifferent w.r.t. . Formally:
Definition 7 (Refinement). Let  and ′ be any two complete preference relations on A.
Then, we say that ′ refines  if and only if
∀f,g ∈A, f 	 g ⇒ f 	′ g,
where 	 and 	′ are the strict parts of  and ′ respectively.
Definition 8. A relation ′ is said to be more specific than a relation  if and only if ′
refines  and  =′.
Obviously, when ′ refines , either they are equivalent (∀f,g: f ′ g ⇔ f  g; this
will be denoted ′ ≡) and provide the same decisions, or the former is more specific
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the relation, the more ties it breaks and the more efficient the decision procedure.
It is important to understand that π and µ originally represent all the information avail-
able to the user, both in terms of plausibility of the actual state of the world and preference
over possible consequences. So, no undesirable arbitrary information should be introduced
in the refined decision model: we are looking for “unbiased” refinements. The commen-
surability between the utility and plausibility evaluations must also be respected by the
refinement, i.e., the interleaving between the evaluations of acts representing pure utility
degrees and the acts representing pure possibility degrees must stay unchanged.
More precisely, within the framework of optimistic QPU, the possibility degree π(s)
of state s is represented by the act x{s}x⊥2 and the utility degree µ(x) of consequence
x is represented by the act x{s}x⊥. Indeed, in this framework the bad consequences do
not matter: x⊥ is neutral and does not induce any drowning effect in the computation:
UOPT,π,µ(x{s}x⊥) = π(s) and UOPT,π,µ(x{s}x⊥) = µ(x). So, when refining OPT,π,µ,
we should not introduce any modification in the comparison of the acts belonging to
LOPT = {x{s}x⊥, s ∈ S} ∪ {x{s}x⊥, x ∈ X}.
Definition 9. Let LOPT = {x{s}x⊥, s ∈ S} ∪ {x{s}x⊥, x ∈ X}. A refinement  of
OPT,π,µ is said to be unbiased iff:
∀f,g ∈ LOPT , f OPT,π,µ g ⇔ f  g.
The construction is a little more complex in the framework of pessimistic QPU, where
the utility degrees are not directly compared to possibility degrees π(s) but to n(π(s)).
Since the neutral consequence is x rather than x⊥ (bad consequences matter, good ones
not), n(π(s)) is represented by act x⊥{s}x and the utility degree µ(x) is represented by
the act x{s}x. It can also be checked that UPES(x{s}x) = µ(x) and UPES(x⊥{s}x) =
n(π(s)). x does not introduce any drowning effect.
Definition 10. Let LPES = {x⊥{s}x, s ∈ S} ∪ {x{s}x, x ∈ X}. A refinement  of
PES,π,µ is said to be unbiased iff:
∀f,g ∈ LPES, f PES,π,µ g ⇔ f  g.
So, we aim at finding an expected utility that both define an unbiased refinement of
OPT,π,µ (resp. PES,π,µ) and is optimistic (resp. pessimistic) in the sense of Wald. The
idea is to build the EU criteria by means of a transformation χ :L → [0,1] that maps π to
a probability distribution:
Definition 11 (Probabilistic transformation of a scale). Let 〈S,X,L,π,µ〉 be a QPU
model. A probabilistic transformation of L w.r.t. π is a mapping χ :L → [0,1] such that
χ(0L) = 0 and p defined over S by p(s) = χ(π(s)),∀s is a probability distribution.
2 Recall that for any x, y ∈ X, A ⊆ S, xAy denotes the act such that xAy(s) = x if s ∈ A, xAy(s) = y oth-
erwise. Recall also that x⊥ and x denote respectively the least and most preferred consequences of X (of
respective utilities µ(x⊥) = 0L and µ(x) = 1L), and (indifferently) the constant acts equal to them.
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bility of an event, represented by a degree of 0L in possibility theory, is expressed by a null
probability. But the most plausible events (possibility degrees of 1L only), obviously do
not always receive a probability degree of 1 since they may be mutually exclusive. Notice
that at the moment it is not assumed that χ is an order-preserving mapping of L. This will
however result from Proposition 5. Anyway, we can define pmax = maxs∈Sχ(π(s)).
In order to transform the utility degrees of Lµ, we use another transformation ψ , map-
ping the utility degrees of L into the set of real numbers. Given that S and X are finite
and that expected utility is not sensitive to linear transformations of the utility scale, the
arbitrary choice of [0,pmax] as target for ψ is made for convenience.
Before going further, notice that this approach based on transformations it not restric-
tive, thanks to the following result:
Proposition 4. For any PU-model 〈S,X,p,u〉, if EU,p,u is an unbiased refinement of
OPT,π,µ then there exist pmax ∈ [0,1] and two order-preserving mappings χ :Lπ →
[0,pmax] and ψ :Lµ → [0,pmax] such that EU,p,u ≡EU,χ◦π,ψ◦µ.
The same property holds when it is an unbiased refinement of PES,π,µ.
Obviously, looking for an unbiased probabilistic refinement implies that π and p =
χ ◦ π (resp. µ and u = ψ ◦ µ) are ordinaly equivalent, i.e., χ and ψ are order-preserving
mappings of L into [0,pmax]:
Proposition 5. Let χ be a probabilistic transformation of Lπ w.r.t. π . Let ψ be a transfor-
mation of Lµ such that ψ(0L) = 0 and ψ(1L) > 0.
If EU,χ◦π,ψ◦µ is an unbiased refinement of OPT,π,µ, then χ (resp. ψ ) is an order-
preserving mapping of Lπ (resp. Lµ) on [0,pmax].
The same property holds when it is an unbiased refinement of PES,π,µ.
We will see in the following that the same probabilistic transformation can be used for
transforming π in both the optimistic case and the pessimistic case. The difference appears
when mapping the utility levels, a difference that is foreseeable since in the optimistic case
we encode a risk seeking behavior—this corresponds to a convex utility function in EU-
theory—while in the pessimistic case we represent a risk adverse behavior: this implies the
concavity of the utility function.
2.1. Expected utility refinements of optimistic QPU
Because of the commensurability assumption, ψ and χ are obviously not totally inde-
pendent of each other. Indeed, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 6. Let χ be a probabilistic transformation of Lπ w.r.t. π . Let ψ be a transfor-
mation of Lµ such that ψ(0L) = 0 and ψ(1L) = χ(1L) = pmax > 0.
If EU,χ◦π,ψ◦µ is an unbiased refinement of OPT,π,µ, then χ = ψ on Lπ .
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such in the comparison of utility and possibility degrees.
In the sequel of this section, we can thus forget about ψ and use only one transformation.
Let us now provide a tractable sufficient condition for this χ to generate an expected utility
that refines OPT,π,µ:
Proposition 7. Let 〈S,X,L,π,µ〉 be a QPU model, and χ be a probabilistic transforma-
tion of L w.r.t. π . Let also H be the condition:
H ∀α,α′ ∈ L s.t. α > α′: χ(α)2 > N · χ(1L) · χ(α′).
Then EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ refines OPT,π,µ whenever χ satisfies H.
H is a sufficient condition to generate an EU-refinement of the optimistic QPU. Impor-
tantly, there always exists a probabilistic transformation of L satisfying H: for example the
series v
N2
, v
N4
, v
N8
, v
N16
, . . . ,0.
Proposition 8. The function χ :L = (α0 = 1L > · · · > αk = 0L) → [0,1] such that
χ(αk) = 0; χ(αi) = v
N2i+1
, i = 0, k − 1,
satisfies H ∀v > 0. χ ◦ π is a probability distribution iff v = 1/(∑i=0,k−1 niN2i+1 ), where
ni = Card({s ∈ S,π(s) = αi}).
In the sequel, χ∗ will denote the function χ(αi) = v/N2i+1 obtained with
v = 1∑
i=0,k−1
ni
N2i+1
.
Example 4. Let us take the QPU model of Example 1, where N = 2, L = {0,1,2,3,4,5}.
We have seen that the following acts are not discriminated by the optimistic criterion
s1 s2
µ(f ) 3 4
µ(g) 3 1
π 5 2
χ∗(L) is the series v
N2
, v
N4
, v
N8
, v
N16
, v
N32
,0 where v = 1/( 1
N2
+ 1
N16
). So:
EU(f ) = χ∗(5) · χ∗(3)+ χ∗(4) · χ∗(2) = v
2
N10
+ v
2
N20
,
EU(g) = χ∗(5) · χ∗(3)+ χ∗(2) · χ∗(1) = v
2
N10
+ v
2
N48
.
	EU,χ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ thus strictly prefers f to g.
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more complex:
H′ ∀α,α′, β ∈ L s.t. β  α > α′, χ(α) · χ(β) > χ(α′) · χ(β)+ (N − 1) · χ(1L) · χ(α′).
It is more general than H, but also sufficient, and is satisfied by our χ∗. It is also satisfied
by another unbiased probabilistic transformation of L:
χ∗∗: χ∗∗(αk) = 0, χ∗∗(αi) = v
(N + 1)2i , i = 0, k − 1,
where v =
( ∑
i=0,k−1
ni
(N + 1)2i
)−1
.
That is to say the series v
N+1 ,
v
(N+1)2 ,
v
(N+1)4 ,
v
(N+1)8 ,
v
(N+1)16 , . . . ,0.
Condition H′ is particularly interesting, since it generates robust transformations, i.e.,
transformations that define unbiased refinements even when knowledge of the problem
(i.e., π or µ) change.
Definition 12 (Robustness). Given 〈S,X,L〉, χ is said to be robust iff whatever π,µ,
EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ is an unbiased refinement of OPT,π,µ.
Proposition 9. χ is robust iff it satisfies H′.
Anyway, χ∗ is actually sufficient to generate all EU-refinements of OPT,π,µ satisfying
H′ as the following proposition shows:
Proposition 10. Given 〈S,X,L,π,µ〉, all the EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ such that χ that satisfies H′
are equivalent.
Notice that this does not mean that χ∗ is its unique generator for the expected utilities
we are interested in: there may exist other unbiased and specific functions χ that attach
different numbers to states (χ ◦ π = χ∗ ◦ π ) or to consequences (χ ◦ µ = χ∗ ◦ µ)—for
instance, χ∗∗. What the proposition means is that the two models are in this case ordinaly
equivalent, i.e., that they make the same decisions and rank events and consequences in the
same way.
One should wonder whether there exist unbiased probabilistic refinements of OPT,π,µ
that are not equivalent to EU,χ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ? Such a class of refinement may exist in some
cases, but fail to follow the full requirement of optimism, as the following example shows.
This is due to the fact that OPT,π,µ is not fully optimistic. So, its refinements, even unbi-
ased, are not required to be optimistic either.
Example 5. Let Lπ = Lµ = L = {0,1,2,3} and let S = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 where Si = {s ∈ S,
π(s) = i}. Let us assume that Card(S3) = 1, Card(S2) = 10 and Card(S1) = 100.
Let us now consider the probabilistic transformation χ :L → [0,1], such that χ(3) = v,
χ(2) = v/20 and χ(1) = v · 10−6 where v is a normalizing constant (v = (1 + 0.5 +
10−4)−1).
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Clearly, χ does not satisfy H′: let α = β = 3 and α′ = 2, then
χ(α) · χ(β) = v2 < χ(α′) · χ(β)+ (N − 1) · χ(1L)χ(α′) = N · v
2
20
= 111
20
v2.
Moreover, when comparing acts sharing the same UOPT , χ and χ∗ can lead to opposite
decisions. Consider, e.g., following acts: f = x3{s1}x⊥ g = x2S1x⊥. Both have UOPT equal
to 1. Now:
EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(f ) = v2 · 10−6, EUχ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ(f ) = v′2 · 1
N10
,
EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(g) = v2 · 5 · 10−6, EUχ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ(g) = v′2 · 100
N12
.
Since N > 100, we observe that f 	EU,χ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ g while g 	EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ f .
The violation of the principle of full optimism can be checked on the same exam-
ple: f,g give non-null consequences only to states S1, which are equi-plausible. Since
x3 	 x2, it holds that f 	maximin,S1 g. Nevertheless, we have seen that g 	EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ f .EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ violates the principle of optimism. On the other hand, the reader can check
that f 	EU,χ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ g.
Now, does there exist probabilistic refinements that are both unbiased and optimistic,
but not equivalent to EU,χ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ? The answer is no for most of the QPU models:
Proposition 11. If EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ and EU,χ ′◦π,χ ′◦µ are two probabilistic refinements of
OPT,π,µ that are both unbiased and optimistic, but not equivalent, then 〈S,X,π,µ,L〉
satisfies the following restriction:
CT ∃a ∈ Lπ s.t. na = Card({s,π(s) = a}) > n1 = Card({s,π(s) = 1L}) and ∃b ∈ Lµ \
Lπ s.t. π(s) > b ⇒ π(s) = 1.
In summary, the exceptions, when they exist3 are very particular—for instance, CT
cannot be satisfied as soon as Lπ = Lµ, as usually assumed in possibilistic decision theory,
nor when the model is pervaded by ignorance (n1  na,∀a), nor in the case of linear
possibility distributions (na = 1,∀a ∈ Lπ ).
The only difference between this proposition and the former is that we wanted a more
natural condition for ensuring the uniqueness of the equivalence class of probabilistic
refinements of optimistic possibilistic QPU than the property H′, hence the notion of opti-
mism. Unfortunately, the optimism condition is not always sufficient. However, as we have
just mentioned, it can be sufficient, e.g., when Lπ = Lµ.
In any case, we get the following result as a summary for optimistic QPU models:
Theorem 1. For any QPU model 〈S,X,L,π,µ〉, there exists a probabilistic transforma-
tion χ∗ of L w.r.t. π such that:
3 We did not manage not build a counter example and we could moreover show that the disagreement, if it
exists, is limited to a small subset of acts.
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• If EU,p,u is an unbiased and optimistic refinement OPT,π,µ then EU,p,u ≡
EU,χ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ unless 〈S,X,L,π,µ〉 satisfies CT .
We have hence obtained what we were looking for: for any QPU model we are able to
propose an EU model that refines OPT,π,µ. As a refinement, it is perfectly compatible with
but more decisive than the optimistic utility. Moreover, it does not use other information
than the original qualitative one—it is unbiased—and better suits the principle of optimism.
Since it is based on expected utility, it obviously satisfies the Sure Thing Principle as well
as Pareto Dominance. Interestingly, it is the most robust of the sound refinements (up to an
equivalence relation) and is equivalent to almost all the unbiased refinements that satisfy
the principle of optimism.
2.2. EU refinements of pessimistic QPU
When considering the pessimistic qualitative model, the same kind of result can be
obtained, noticing that PES,π,µ and OPT,π,µ are dual relations:
Proposition 12. Let 〈S,X,L,π,µ〉 be a QPU model. Then ∀f,g ∈A, f PES,π,µ g ⇔
g OPT,π,n◦µ f.
Proposition 13. Let 〈S,X,L,π,µ〉 be a QPU model and let n be the order reversing
mapping of L. Let 〈p,u〉 a probabilistic model and u¯ the utility function defined by u¯(x) =
u(x)− u(x),∀x ∈ X. It holds that:
• EU,p,u refines OPT,π,µ iff EU,p,u¯ refines PES,π,n◦µ.
• EU,p,u¯ is pessimistic iff EU,p,u is optimistic.
• EU,p,u is an unbiased refinement of OPT,π,µ iff EU,p,u¯ is an unbiased refinement
of PES,π,n◦µ.
As a consequence, it is always possible to build a probabilistic transformation χ∗ us-
ing Theorem 1, a probability p = χ∗ ◦ π , a utility function u = χ∗ ◦ µ and a utility
function u′ = ψ∗ ◦ n ◦ µ—with ψ∗(α) = χ∗(1L) − χ∗(α),∀α ∈ Lµ—that define an un-
biased EU-refinement of PES,π,µ. Note that u′(x) = u(x) − u(x′) where x′ is such that
µ(x′) = n(µ(x)). Note also that from the definition of u¯ we have u¯(x) + u(x) = u(x) =
χ∗(1L),∀x.
Fig. 1 shows the functions u, u¯ and u′ on a graph.
This provides the following pessimistic counterpart of Theorem 1:
Theorem 2. For any QPU model 〈S,X,L,π,µ〉, there exists at least one pair of transfor-
mations (χ∗,ψ∗) of L such that:
• EU,χ∗◦π,ψ∗◦µ is an unbiased refinement of PES,π,µ.
• For any PU model 〈p,u〉, if EU,p,u is an unbiased refinement of PES,π,µ that satis-
fies Wald’s principle of pessimism, then EU,p,u is equivalent to EU,χ∗◦π,ψ∗◦µ unless
〈S,X,L,π,µ〉 satisfies CT.
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EU,χ∗◦π,ψ∗◦µ uses the same probability distribution p = χ∗ ◦π as its optimistic coun-
terpart. The corresponding measure P is actually a “big-stepped probability” in the sense
of [7,8], i.e., satisfies
∀s ∈ S, P ({s}) > P ({s′ s.t. P({s′}) < P ({s})}).
Such measures are often encountered in the AI literature, directly (in, e.g., [1,26]) or in-
directly (they for instance, have much in common with Spohn’s κ-functions [27]: these
disbelief degrees can indeed be interpreted as the order of magnitude of an ε probabil-
ity [15,23], which is obviously a big stepped probability). They also form a special class
of lexicographic probabilities in the sense of [2,21]—we add the restriction that here all
the states within a single cluster are equi-probable. Indeed each cluster corresponds to a
class of equi-possible states and since we are looking for unbiased transformations, equi-
possibility leads to equi-probability. More details on Big-Stepped probabilities are out of
the scope of this paper and can be found in [7].
At this point in the paper we have proved an important result for bridging qualitative
possibilistic decision theory and expected utility theory: we have shown that any optimistic
or pessimistic QPU model can be refined by an EU-model. Thus, we can conclude that (i)
possibilistic decision criteria are compatible with the classical expected utility criterion
and (ii) choosing an EU-model is advantageous, since it both leads to an EU-refinement
of the original rule (thus overcomes the lack of decisiveness of the possibilistic criteria), it
satisfies the STP and the principle of Pareto dominance, and allows to fully recover Wald’s
qualitative principles.
But this does not mean that qualitativeness and ordinality are given up. In the following
we are going to show that, although probabilistic and based on additive manipulations of
numbers, these criteria remain ordinal. This is very natural: since we start with an ordinal
model and do not accept any bias, we produce another (probabilistic but) ordinal model,
in which the numbers only encode orders of magnitude—this is the topic of the next sec-
tion.
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To establish this claim, this section relates the previously defined EU criteria to an ordi-
nal comparison of vectors. When S is finite, the comparison of acts can indeed be seen as
a comparison of vectors of pairs of elements of L:
Definition 13. The representative vector of any act f ∈A is the vector
f = ((π1,µ1), . . . , (πi,µi), . . . (πN ,µN)),
where πi stands for π(si) and µi for µ(f (si)).
Comparing acts thus amounts to comparing elements of (L2)N . For instance, OPT,π,µ
is a restriction to the case M = 2 of the general Maxmin relation on (LM)N .
Definition 14 (Maxmin relation). Let u, v ∈ (LM)N . Then
u Maxmin v ⇔ max
i=1,N
min
j=1,M ui,j  maxi=1,N minj=1,M vi,j
where wi,j is the j th element of the ith vector of w ∈ (LM)N
If u and v are representative of some acts, M = 2 and it is obvious that f OPT,π,µ
g ⇔ f Maxmin g. In this section we will propose a refinement of Maxmin, based only on
the ordinal comparison of degrees and we will show the equivalence between this purely
syntactical decision rule and the above EU optimistic model.
3.1. Case of total ignorance
Let us first consider the degenerate case of total ignorance, where ∀s ∈ S,π(s) = 1L.
In this case, the comparison of acts comes down to the comparison of utility degrees:
f = ((1L,µ1), . . . , (1L,µN)) becomes f = (µ1, . . . ,µN). So,
f OPT,π,µ g iff f Max g and f PES,π,µ g iff f Min g.
In decision making, the comparison of vectors by the max and min operators is well known,
as it is known that it suffers from a lack of decisive power. This is why refinements of min
and max have been proposed [22]:
Definition 15 (Leximax, Leximin). Let u, v ∈ LN . Then:
u lmax v ⇔ (∀j,u(j) = v(j)) or (∃i,∀j < i,u(j) = v(j) and u(i) > v(i)),
u lmin v ⇔ (∀j,u(j) = v(j)) or (∃i,∀j > i,u(j) = v(j) and u(i) > v(i))
or (∃i, j, ui = vj = 0L)
where, for any w ∈ LN , w(k) is the kth biggest element of w (i.e., w(1)  · · ·w(N)).
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increasing (resp. decreasing) order and then lexicographically comparing them.
Example 6. Let u = (3,2,4) and v = (2,2,4).
u 	lmax v since u(1) = v(1) = 4 and u(2) = 3 > v(2) = 2.
u 	lmin v since u(3) = v(3) = 2 and u(2) = 3 > v(2) = 2.
It is obvious that lmax refines max and lmin refines min. Moreover, both relations
escape the drowning effect and are very efficient: the only pairs of ties are vectors that are
identical up to a permutation of their elements.
3.2. General case
Since the leximax and leximin comparisons are good candidates in a particular case,
we have imagined an extension of these procedures to the case of 2 dimensions ((LM)N
instead of LN ). The only thing that we need is to use any complete preorder  on vectors
of LM instead of the classical relation  on L. It then possible to order the sub-vectors of
any w according to  and to apply any of the two previous procedures:
Definition 16 (Leximax(), Leximin()). Let be a complete preorder on LM , its strict
part and ∼= its symmetric part (a ∼= b ⇔ a  b and b a). Let u, v ∈ (LM)N .
• u lmax() v ⇔ (∀j,u(,j) ∼= v(,j) or ∃i s.t. ∀j < i,u(,j) ∼= v(,j) and u(,i) 
v(,i));
• u lmin() v ⇔ (∀j,u(,j) ∼= v(,j) or ∃i s.t. ∀j > i,u(,j) ∼= v(,j) and u(,i) 
v(,i)),
where, for any w ∈ (LM)N , w(,i) the ith biggest sub-vector of w according to .
The leximax procedure can in particular be applied to the preorder =lmin. In prac-
tice, this comparison consists in first ordering the elements of each sub-vector in increasing
order w.r.t , then in ordering the sub-vectors in decreasing order (w.r.t. lmin). It is then
enough to lexicographically compare the two new vectors of vectors.
Proposition 14 (lmax(lmin) order).
(i) lmax(lmin) is a complete preorder;
(ii) lmax(lmin) refines maxmin;
(iii) If N = 1, then lmax(lmin) ≡lmin;
(iv) If M = 1, then lmax(lmin) ≡lmax.
So, lmax(lmin) is the refinement of maxmin we are looking for. Let us now compare
representative vectors of acts using this relation (letting M = 2)—we obtain a refinement
of OPT,π,µ:
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f lmax(lmin) g ⇔ f lmax(lmin) g
refines OPT,π,µ.
Example 7. The representative vectors of f and g in Example 1 are: f = ((5,3), (2,4)),
g = ((5,3), (2,1)). (5,3) ∼=lmin (5,3), (4,2) 	lmin (2,1)), so f 	lmax(lmin) g.
The same kind of reasoning can be followed to refine PES,π,µ. The pessimistic utility
of act f is mins∈S max(n(π(s)),µ(f (s))). We need to refine a minmax procedure, and this
can be done using lmin(lmax). Since operator max does not apply to (π(s),µ(f (s))) but
to (n(π(s)),µ(f (s))), we use the π -reverse vectors of acts:
Definition 17. The π -reverse vector of an act f ∈A is
n(f ) = ((n(π(s1)),µ(f (s1)), . . . , (n(π(sN)),µ(f (sN))).
Proposition 16. The relation lmin(lmax,n) defined by:
f lmin(lmax,n) g ⇔ n(f ) lmin(lmax) n(g)
refines PES,π,µ.
Refining PES,π,µ leads to the application of the leximin(leximax) comparison to the
π -reverse vectors, while refining OPT,π,µ involves the leximax(leximin) comparison di-
rectly to the representative vectors. Both procedures are purely ordinal: the degrees in L
are only compared using min, max and reverse operators—only their relative order matters.
Our final result is that these refinements are equivalent to the specific EU-refinements
identified in Section 2.
Theorem 3. Let 〈S,X,L,π,µ〉 be a QPU model. It holds that:
(i) EU,χ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ ≡lmax(lmin),
(ii) EU,χ∗◦π,ψ∗◦µ ≡lmin(lmax,n).
From Theorems 1 and 2, it immediately comes that:
Corollary 1. Let 〈S,X,L,π,µ〉 be a QPU model and EU,p,u (resp. EU,p′,u′ ) any of op-
timistic (resp. pessimistic) unbiased probabilistic refinement of OPT,π,µ (resp. PES,π,µ).
It holds that:
(i) EU,p,u ≡lmax(lmin) unless 〈S,X,L,π,µ〉 obeys CT,
(ii) EU,p′,u′ ≡lmin(lmax,n) unless 〈S,X,L,π,µ〉 obeys CT.
So, the probabilistic refinements of possibilistic utilities defined in Section 5 are equiv-
alent to purely comparative procedures. This is why we can say that efficient QPU re-
finements are probabilistic but remain qualitative. Reciprocally, we can prove that the
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a representation by a sum (on N ) of products (on M), provided that L be finite.
Proposition 17. Let L be a finite scale and lmax(lmin) be a relation on (LM)N . There
exists a mapping χ of L into the real line such that: ∀F,G ∈ (LM)N
F lmax(lmin) G iff
∑
i=1,N
∏
j=1,M
χ(Fi,j )
∑
i=1,N
∏
j=1,M
χ(Gi,j ).
Notice that this encoding is not possible when L is not finite: this was proved by
Moulin [22], who shows that in the continuous case the leximin and leximax procedure
cannot be encoded by a weighted sum.4 However, the leximax/min procedures can hope-
fully still be used in the case where L is continuous, provided that S and X be finite: they
are soundly defined on (LM)N and refine max(min) (resp. min(max)).
4. Qualitative EU refinement of Order of Magnitude Expected Utility (OMEU)
The Order of Magnitude Expected Utility Theory (OMEU) is an appealing approach
that has received much attention in the past ten years, by, e.g., [3,23,28], or more recently
by [16] or [4]. Certainly, QPU and OMEU theories are the most prominent attempts from
the AI community to deal with qualitative decision under uncertainty, as they have been
studied from both axiomatic and operational (in terms of sequential decision) point of
views.
Very close to but different from the possibilistic one, order of magnitude expected utility
also fail to be efficient in the sense of Pareto. However, it is easy to extend the results we
have shown for qualitative possibilistic utility to order of magnitude expected utility theory
as well. We will indeed show a result very close in spirit to the one we have shown for
QPU: It is possible to use a leximax approach so as to refine an OMEU relation, and the
obtained refinement is the unique representative of all EU-based refinements of the OMEU
relation.
4.1. Order of Magnitude Expected Utility
Order of Magnitude Expected Utility theory relies on a qualitative representation of
beliefs, initially proposed by Spohn [27], via Ordinal Conditional Functions, and later
popularized under the term kappa-rankings.
Definition 18 (Kappa-rankings). κ : 2S → Z+ ∪ {+∞} is a kappa-ranking if and only if it
obeys the following axioms [27]:
4 [22] indeed presents some continuous examples of leximin or leximax comparison that cannot be encoded by
a continuous aggregation. So, lmax(lmin) (resp. lmax(lmin)) on (LM)N cannot always be represented by a
weighted sum under the restrictions M = 1 or N = 1 (and thus in the general case).
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S2 κ(A) = mins∈A κ({s}) if ∅ = A ⊆ S, κ(∅) = +∞.
Note that event A is more likely than event B if and only if κ(A) < κ(B): kappa-
rankings have been termed as “disbelief functions”. In fact, kappa-rankings have received
an interpretation in terms of order of magnitude of “small” probabilities. “κ(A) = i” is
equivalent to P(A) is of the same order of εi , for a given fixed infinitesimal ε.
Order of magnitude utilities have been defined in the same way as order of magnitude
probabilities [23,28]. Namely, an order of magnitude function µ : X → Z+ ∪{+∞} can be
defined in order to rank consequences in terms of degrees of “dissatisfaction”. Once again,
µ(x) < µ(x′) if and only if x is more desirable than x′, µ(x) = 0 for the most desirable
consequences, and µ(x) = +∞ for the least desirable consequences. µ is interpreted as:
µ(x) = i is equivalent to u(x) is of the same order of εi , for a given fixed infinitesimal ε.
An order of magnitude expected utility (OMEU) model can then be defined (see [16,23,
28] among others):
Definition 19 (Order of magnitude expected utility). Let κ be a kappa ranking over S and
µ an order of magnitude utility function over X (with values in Z+ ∪ {+∞}).
∀f ∈ XS, OMEUκ,µ(f ) = min
s∈S
{
κ({s})+µ(f (s))}.
Then, the OMEU preference relation OMEU,κ,µ is defined as:
Definition 20. OMEU preference relation.
∀f,g ∈ XS, f OMEU,κ,µ g ⇔ OMEUκ,µ(f )OMEUκ,µ(g).
In [28], an interpretation of κ(s) and µ(x) as orders of magnitude of polynomials (of
an infinitesimal variable ε) representing the values p(s) and u(x) respectively, has been
proposed. Namely, p(s) = α(s) · εκ(s) + o(εκ(s)) and u(x) = β(x) · εµ(x) + o(εµ(x)), with
α(s) and β(x) positive. Then, noticing that
EUp,u(f ) =
∑
s∈S
p(s) · u(f (s))
=
∑
s∈S
α(s) · β(f (s)) · εκ(s)+µ(f (s)) + o(εκ(s)+µ(f (s))),
we get that OMEUκ,µ(f ) = mins∈S(κ(s) + µ(f (s))) is exactly the order of magnitude of
EUp,u(f ).
As we have already pointed out, kappa-rankings and possibility measures are equiva-
lent: for any kappa-ranking it is possible to build a possibility measure which orders events
in the same way. But the similarity stops when the models are extended to two dimensions.
The following example indeed shows two models (π,µ) and (κ,µ′) ordering events and
consequences in the same order but such that f 	OPT,π,µ g and g 	OMEU,κ,µ′ f .
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g = x′{s′}x⊥, with π(s) = µ(x) = 3 and π(s′) = 2,µ(x′) = 5. We have UOPT,π,µ(f ) =
3 > UOPT,π,µ(g) = 2, so f is preferred to g in the (optimistic) QPU framework.
Now let us consider ϕ :L → Z+ ∪{+∞} be defined as: ϕ(α) = 5−α,∀α ∈ L−{0} and
ϕ(0) = +∞. κ = ϕ ◦Π is a kappa-ranking which ranks events in the same order as Π , and
so does µ′ = ϕ ◦µ for consequences. Still, we have OMEUκ,µ′(f ) = 4 > OMEUκ,µ′(g) =
3, so that g is preferred to f in the OMEU framework.
The same kind of counterexample can be found for showing that OMEU and pessimistic
QPU differ.
4.2. Leximax and EU refinements of OMEU
As for Qualitative Possibilistic Utilities, Order of Magnitude Expected Utility suffers
from a lack of decision power. Indeed, as soon as two acts f and g give an identical
“excellent” consequence x (of utility µ(x) = 0) in two fully plausible states s and s′
(κ(s) = κ(s′) = 0), i.e., f (s) = g(s′) = x, the two acts are indifferent whatever conse-
quences they may have in other states. For instance, it can be that µ(f (s′′)) = +∞,∀s′′ = s
and µ(g(s′′)) = 0,∀s′′ = s′ but still f and g are indifferent, which is counterintuitive.
Our objective is to find a refinement of an OMEU preference relation OMEU,κ,µ that
will allow to rule out this kind of counterintuitive result.
An obvious refinement of a min-based decision criterion is the one based on a leximin
instead of the min. The Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ can be defined as follows:
Definition 21 (Lexi-OMEU preference relation). Let S = {s1, . . . , sn}, f,g be any two acts,f = (κ(si)+µ(f (si))i∈1...n and g = (κ(si)+µ(g(si))i∈1...n. Then,
f Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ g ⇔ f lmin g.
Notice that the Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ is represented by a lmin relation, as OMEU,κ,µ is rep-
resented by a min relation.
Obviously, Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ refines the preference relation OMEU,κ,µ. This is a trivial
consequence of Proposition 14 (in the case where N = 1), that states that lmin refines
min:
Proposition 18. Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ refines OMEU,κ,µ.
Our next point will be, as can easily be guessed, to show that this refinement can be
represented by an expected utility. Namely, we are going to show that there exist p a
probability distribution over S and u a utility function over X, such that Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ ≡
EU,p,u.
More precisely, let us choose arbitrarily 0 < ε  1/(|S| + 1) and define α = 1/
(
∑
s∈S εκ(s)). Let us also define pε(s) = α · εκ(s),∀s ∈ S, a probability distribution and
uε(x) = εµ(x),∀x ∈ X a utility function, both taking their values in [0,1] (recall that
ε−∞ =def 0). The next proposition holds:
Proposition 19. Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ ≡EU,pε,uε .
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refined by Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ. The answer depends on the precision of the definition of the
unbiasedness of an OMEU-refinement. The use of Definition 9 would lead to a negative
result, as shown by Example 9.
Example 9. The current example shows that it is possible to find an OMEU model
〈S,X,L,κ,µ〉, an unbiased EU refinement EU,p,u of OMEU,κ,µ and two acts f and
g such that f ∼OMEU,κ,µ g, but g 	Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ f and f 	EU,p,u g.
Let f and g be the two acts defined by:
s1 s2 s3
µ(f ) 0 1 3
µ(g) 0 3 2
κ 0 4 2
Let also χ ′ be the function over {0, . . . ,+∞} defined as
χ ′(0) = 1, χ ′(1) = 1
N
, χ ′(i) = 1
Ni+1
∀i > 1, χ(+∞) = 0,
where N = |S| = 3.
Let then α = (∑s∈S χ ′(κ(s)))−1 and χ = α · χ ′. It can be checked that p = χ ◦ κ is
a probability distribution over S = {s1, s2, s3}. Let also u = χ ◦ µ. It is easy to check that
EU,p,u ≡OMEU,κ,µ over LOPT . Indeed, OMEUκ,µ(x{s}x⊥) = µ(x) + κ(s) = κ(s)
and OMEUκ,µ(x{s}x⊥) = µ(x) + κ(s) = µ(x) and EUp,u(x{s}x⊥) = α · χ ◦ κ(s)
and EUp,u(x{s}x⊥) = α · χ ◦ µ(s). Since χ is strictly decreasing, both preorders are
clearly equivalent.
It is also possible to check that EU,p,u refines OMEU,κ,µ over XS . This is due to the
fact that the following proposition holds for all i, j, i′, j ′ in {0, . . . ,+∞}:
i + j < i′ + j ′ ⇒ χ(i) · χ(j) > χ(i′) · χ(j ′).
Finally, the counterexample comes from the fact that g 	Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ f (since {0,4,7}
<lmin {0,5,5} and that f 	EU,p,u g since EUp,u(f ) = α2 · (1 + 1/N6 + 1/N7) >
EUp,u(g) = α2 · (1 + 1/N6 + 1/N9). So, EU,p,u ≡OMEU,κ,µ.
On the other hand the OMEU criterion seems intuitively closer to EU than the possi-
bilistic criteria. Indeed, it suffers from only one drowning effect (because of the presence
of a min), when the possibilistic criteria suffer from a “double” drowning effect (one due
to the max operator, the other due to the min one). So, the notion of unbiasedness should
be strengthened in the OMEU case:
Definition 22. Let LOMEU = {x{s}x⊥}(x,s)∈X×S ⊂ XS . A refinement  of OMEU,κ,µ is
said to be unbiased if and only if
∀f,g ∈ LOMEU, f OMEU,κ,µ g ⇔ f  g.
This definition is clearly stronger than the optimistic condition in which we required an
equivalence of the two preference relations on LOPT = {x{s}x⊥}x∈X ∪ {x{s}x⊥}s∈S , a
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set of “elementary acts” LOMEU and not only on its strict subset LOPT .5
This better definition of unbiasedness yields a result stronger than in the possibilistic
case: Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ represents every possible unbiased EU-refinement of OMEU,κ,µ, and
not just refine them.
Proposition 20. If EU,p,u is a unbiased refinement of OMEU,κ,µ, then
EU,p,u ≡Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ .
5. Conclusion
The topic of Qualitative Decision Theory has received much attention in the past few
years and several approaches, including QPU, have been proposed. This latter model forms
a convenient framework for a qualitative expression of problems of decision under uncer-
tainty. However, it suffers from a lack of decisiveness. In this paper,we have proposed
EU-based refinements of QPU which proved to be perfectly compatible with the original
qualitative expression of knowledge and preferences: the only difference is that lexico-
graphic (leximax(leximin) or leximin(leximax)) comparisons are used instead of maxmin
or minmax. In addition to the EU-based refinements of the qualitative possibilistic util-
ities, we have also provided EU refinements for the order of magnitude expected utility
(OMEU) criterion. The axiomatization of these decision procedures is out of the scope of
this paper. However, it is possible and is left for further research. For the refinements of
the QPU, it would consist in the 5 basic Savagean axioms, together with “mild” versions
of the pessimism or optimism axioms of possibilistic utilities.
We have seen that the probability distribution underlying EU-based refinements is a
big-stepped one and, as such, has much is common with lexicographic probabilities in the
sense of [2,21]. [19–21] have studied decision models of decision under uncertainty using
lexicographic probabilities or lexicographic utilities, but in these models the lexicographic
characteristic is used only on one of the two dimensions (either the likelihood level, or the
utility level). We operate on both dimensions simultaneously using a join transformation.
We could generalize their approach, independently of the transformation of any possibilis-
tic model, thus defining “Big-stepped expected utilities” as PU-models such that:
∀s ∈ S,∀x ∈ X s.t. p(s) > 0 and u(x) > 0,
p(s) · u(x) >
∑
s′ =s
p(s′) · ( max
y/p(s′).u(y)<p(s).u(x)
u(y)
)
.
EU,χ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ and EU,χ∗◦π,1−χ∗◦n◦µ are two instances of big-stepped expected utilities.
Other instances exist: the “one dimension” big-stepped expected utilities proposed by [20]
5 The problem was, in the possibilistic case, that due to the presence of two idempotents operators (max and
min), it was impossible for expected utility and possibilistic utility to agree on the whole set of elementary acts
LOMEU .
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positive utility level is considered.
Another possible extension of our work is to look for refinements of monotonic util-
ities, a family of decision criteria based on Sugeno integral which generalize QPU [12].
Monotonic utilities admit a maxmin expression maxs∈S(min(σ (Fs),µ(f (s)))), where
σ : 2S → L is a monotonic measure and Fs = {s′ ∈ S s.t. µ(f (s′))  µ(f (s))}. Again,
we conjecture that replacing min and max with their lexicographical versions allows an
efficient refinement and leads to Choquet-EU criteria [17].
Finally, we aim at dealing with sequential decision making. Indeed, a framework for se-
quential decision making with qualitative possibilistic utilities has been proposed by [13,
24]. In this framework, the possibility of a given sequence of states under a fixed policy is
the minimum of the transition possibilities between two successive states of the sequence
(instead of the product in the probabilistic case). When utility levels are assigned to in-
dividual transitions, the overall utility of a sequence can be either the maximum (in the
optimistic case) or the minimum of these utility levels (pessimistic utility). Clearly, this
temporal aggregation of uncertainty/utility levels based on maximum or minimum opera-
tors induces again a lack of decisiveness. We conjecture that it is possible to find unbiased
probabilistic transformations of L that allow to refine the possibilistic preference relations
over policies proposed in [13] by expected utility relations. The computation of policies
which are optimal w.r.t. the refined EU relation could then be done by usual stochastic
dynamic programming methods (backwards induction)—and we conjecture that it would
be equivalent to lexicographic procedures extending the one stage procedures described in
this paper.
Appendix A. Proofs
In the following proofs, we shall use UOPT (resp. UPES, OPT,π,µ, PES,π,µ) instead of
UOPT,π,µ (resp. UPES,π,µ, OPT,π,µ, PES,π,µ) when there is no ambiguity on the under-
lying QPU model (i.e., on π and µ).
Proof of Proposition 1. (⇐) When π expresses a total certainty in the realization of
a given state s∗, UOPT(f ) = UPES(f ) = µ(f (s∗)) and all events are null except those
containing s∗, which are certain. Indeed, if s∗ /∈ A, UOPT(fAh) = UOPT(gAh) = µ(h(s∗))
and UPES(fAh) = UPES(gAh) = µ(h(s∗))).
(⇒) Suppose there exist s1 = s2 such that π(s1)  π(s2) > 0L. Then, we have
x{s2}x⊥ 	OPT x∅x⊥ and x{s1, s2}x⊥ OPT x{s1}x⊥, which violates the STP. So, if
OPT satisfies the STP then there exists at most one s∗ such that π(s∗) > 0L. Since π is
normalized, s∗ exists and π(s∗) = 1L. The proof for the pessimistic case is similar, starting
from x 	PES x⊥{s2}x and x⊥{s1, s2}x PES x⊥{s1}x. 
Proof of Proposition 2. It is easily noticed that ∀f ∈A,∀s ∈ S,x X f (s) X x⊥. So,
if  satisfies the weak Pareto principle, then fx  f  fx⊥ . 
268 H. Fargier, R. Sabbadin / Artificial Intelligence 164 (2005) 245–280Proof of Proposition 3. (⇐) Suppose that ∀s,π(s) = 1 (total ignorance). Then any subset
A of S is a set of equi-plausible states and whatever f , UOPT(f ) = maxs∈Sµ(f (s)) and
UPES(f ) = mins∈Sµ(f (s)).
Consider a set A ⊆ S of equi-plausible states and a pair f,g such that f >maximin,A g.
Then by definition ofmaximin there must be a s∗ ∈ A such that for any s ∈ A, µ(f (s∗)) 	X
µ(g(s)). Then µ(f (s∗)) > maxs∈Aµ(g(s)) and thus
µ
(
f (s∗)
)
> max
(
maxs∈Aµ
(
g(s)
)
, x⊥
)
.
So, for any A, f >maximin,A g implies UOPT(fAx⊥) > UOPT(gAx⊥).
For the pessimistic case, f >maximax,A g means that there is a s∗ ∈ A such that for any
s ∈ A, µ(g(s∗)) < µ(f (s)). Then µ(g(s∗)) < mins∈Aµ(f (s)) and thus
µ
(
g(s∗)
)
< min
(
mins∈Aµ
(
g(s)
)
,µ(x)
)
.
So, for any A,f >maximin,A g implies UPES(gAx) < UPES(fAx).
(⇒) Suppose that there exists sa ∈ S such that π(sa) = α < 1L. A = {sa} is obviously a
set of equi-plausible states. Moreover, since Lπ ⊆ Lµ, there exist a xa such that µ(xa) = α
Consider the acts f = x{sa}x⊥ and g = xa{sa}x⊥. Since α < µ(x), f >maximin,A g.
On the other hand it holds that UOPT(f ) = UOPT(g) = α. So, OPT is not optimistic.
Similarly, it can be checked that α < µ(x) implies the non-pessimism of PES—
a counter example can be built considering the acts x{sa}x and xa{sa}x. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider any PU-model 〈S,X,p,u〉 such that EU,p,u is an un-
biased refinement of OPT,π,µ.
Let us denote u′ the linear transformation of u such as u′(x⊥) = 0 and u′(x) =
maxs∈S p(s). EU,p,u′ is equivalent to EU,p,u (expected utility is indeed not sensitive
to linear transformations of the utility function). EU,p,u′ is also unbiased.
µ (resp. π ) partitions X (resp. S) into equivalence classes of same utility (resp. pos-
sibility). Let µ−1(α) (resp. π−1(α)) be one of the x (resp. s) such that µ(x) = α (resp.
π(s) = α).
It is then easy to define ψ(α) = u′(µ−1(α)) and χ(α) = p(π−1(α)) and obviously
EU,p,u ≡EU,χ◦π,ψ◦µ. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider any s, s′ ∈ S such that π(s) = α and π(s′) = α′. Let
f = x{s}x⊥ and f ′ = x{s′}x⊥. Notice that UOPT,π,µ(f ) = α and UOPT,π,µ(f ′) = α′.
Note also that EUχ◦π,ψ◦µ(f ) = ψ(1L) · χ(α) and EUχ◦π,ψ◦µ(f ′) = ψ(1L) · χ(α′), since
ψ(0L) = 0.
Now, since EU,χ◦π,ψ◦µ is an unbiased refinement of OPT,π,µ, we have α  α′ ⇔
ψ(1L) · χ(α) ψ(1L) · χ(α′) ⇔ χ(α) χ(α′) (since ψ(1L) > 0). So, χ is an order pre-
serving mapping of Lπ .
We show in the same way that ψ is order preserving, starting from f = x{s}x⊥ and
f ′ = x′{s}x⊥, with µ(x) = α and µ(x′) = α′. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider any s ∈ S of possibility α and any x ∈ X of utility β .
Let f = x{s}x⊥ and g = x{s}x⊥ two acts representative of α and β respectively. Since
EU,χ◦π,ψ◦µ is an unbiased refinement, α  β ⇔ EUχ◦π,ψ◦µ(f ) EUχ◦π,ψ◦µ(g).
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ψ(1L) = χ(1L) = pmax.
So, α  β ⇔ χ(α)  ψ(β). One can prove in the same way that α  β ⇔ χ(α) 
ψ(β).
So, for any α ∈ Lπ ⊆ Lµ, we get χ(α) = ψ(α). This can be extended to any α in L by
defining arbitrarily χ(α) =def ψ(α),∀α /∈ Lπ . 
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that UOPT,π,µ(f ) = α > UOPT,π,µ(g) = α′ and let us
show that, when H holds, EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(f ) > EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(g).
UOPT,π,µ(f ) = α implies that ∃s∗,min(π(s∗),µ(f (s∗))) = α, so π(s∗)  α and
µ(f (s∗) α.
EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(f ) =
∑
s
χ
(
π(s)
)
.χ
(
f (s)
)
 χ
(
π(s∗)
) · χ(f (s∗)).
Since χ is unbiased, π(s∗) α and µ(f (s∗) α imply that both χ(π(s∗)) and χ(f (s∗))
are greater or equal to χ(α), so we get EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(f ) χ(α)2.
UOPT,π,µ(g) = α′ implies that α′ min(π(s),µ(g(s)),∀s ∈ S. Let us denote g−(s) =
min(π(s),µ(g(s))) and g+(s) = max(π(s),µ(g(s)). Whatever s, α′  g−(s) and 1L 
g+(s). So, since χ is assumed unbiased, whatever s, χ(1L) ·χ(α′) χ(π(s)) ·χ(µ(g(s))).
Summing on the states, we get:
∑
s∈S χ(1L) · χ(α′)  EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(g), i.e., N · χ(1L) ·
χ(α′) EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(g).
So EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(f ) χ(α)2 and N · χ(1L) · χ(α′) EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(g). Since H: χ(α)2 >
N.χ(1L) · χ(α′) is assumed, we can conclude that EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(f ) > EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(g). 
Proof of Proposition 8. It holds that
N · χ(1L) · χ(αi+1)
χ(αi)2
= N
N2
· (N
2i+1)2
N2i+1+1
= N
N2
· N
2i+2
N2i+2
= N
N2
,
i.e., that
N · χ(1L) · χ(αi+1)
χ(αi)2
 1
whatever i < k − 1. For i = k − 1, the condition also holds, since χ(αi+1) = 0. This shows
that H is satisfied by the series. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Let 〈S,X,L〉 be given, as well as χ :L → [0,1].
The proof is twofold:
(⇒) Let us first assume that χ is robust. Let us consider any β  α > α′, with α,α′, β ∈
L. Let also {x, x′} ∈ X and s ∈ S, and let us define π and µ by µ(x) = α, µ(x′) = α′,
π(s) = β and π(s′) = 1L,∀s′ = s. Since χ is robust, EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ refines OPT,π,µ.
Let us now consider acts f = x{s}x⊥ and g = x′. Obviously, UOPT(f ) = min(α,β) >
UOPT(g) = α′. Since EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ refines OPT,π,µ, we have
EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(f ) > EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(g),
which means that χ(α) · χ(β) > χ(α′) · χ(β)+ (N − 1) · χ(1L) · χ(α′).
Since this holds for any β  α > α′, H′ holds.
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Let us assume f 	OPT,π,µ g. This means that it exists s∗ such that ∀s,
min
(
π(s∗),µ
(
f (s∗)
))
> min
(
π(s),µ
(
g(s)
))
.
In particular, µ(g(s∗)) < min(π(s∗),µ(f (s∗))).
Let us denote α = min(π(s∗),µ(f (s∗))) and β = max(π(s∗),µ(f (s∗))). Let us define
f ∗ from f as f ∗ = f (s∗){s∗}x⊥. We still have f ∗ 	OPT,π,µ g.
Let us now denote α′ = max{l ∈ L, l < α}. We have µ(g(s∗))  α′, and ∀s = s∗,
min(π(s),µ(g(s)))  α′ and obviously max(π(s),µ(g(s)))  1L. This means that
∀s = s∗, χ(π(s)) · χ(µ(g(s))) χ(α′) · χ(1L).
Now, since χ obeys H′, we have
EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(f ) EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(f ∗) = χ(α) · χ(β)
> χ(α′) · χ(β)+ (N − 1) · χ(1L) · χ(α′) EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(g),
so that f 	EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ g.
Since this holds for any given π and µ, we get that χ is robust. 
Proof of Proposition 10.
Lemma A.1. Let χ1 and χ2 be two unbiased transformation of L refining OPT,π,µ. It
holds that: ∀α,α′ ∈ Lµ,∀β,β ′ ∈ Lπ :
χ1(α).χ1(β) > χ1(α
′).χ1(β ′) ⇔ χ2(α).χ2(β) > χ2(α′).χ2(β ′).
Assume χ1(α).χ1(β) > χ1(α′).χ1(β ′). First, we show that min(α,β)min(α′, β ′).
Let f = x{s}x⊥ and g = x′{s′}x⊥, with µ(x) = α,µ(x′) = α′,π(s) = β and π(s′) =
β ′. Then, χ1(α).χ1(β) > χ1(α′).χ1(β ′) ⇔ f >EU,χ1◦π,χ1◦,µ g ⇒ f OPT g (refinement
property). But, by definition, f OPT g ⇔ min(α,β)min(α′, β ′).
From now on, there are two solutions:
• min(α,β) > min(α′, β ′), which implies f >OPT g, from which we get
f >EU,χ2◦π,χ2◦,µ g
for all refinement χ2.
• or min(α,β) = min(α′, β ′), but then, in order to have χ1(α).χ1(β) > χ1(α′).χ1(β ′),
we must have max(α,β) > max(α′, β ′). Now, since χ2 is unbiased and thus order-
preserving, we get χ2(α).χ2(β) > χ2(α′).χ2(β ′) too. 
Lemma A.2. For any probabilistic transformation χ of L satisfying H′ it holds that:
If ∃s∗ such that ∀s,χ(π(s∗)).χ(µ(f (s∗)))> χ(π(s)).χ(µ(g(s)))
then f 	EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ g.
First, notice that ∀c > c− ∈ L,χ(c) > N.χ(c−) (set β = 1L,α = c and α′ = c′ in con-
dition H′).
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If for any s, min(π(s),µ(g(s))) < a then UOPT(g) < UOPT(f ). Since χ satisfies H′
and thus defines a refinement of OPT : f 	EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ g.
Otherwise, there must be couples (π(s),µ(g(s))) the min of which is equal to a. Since
χ(π(s∗)).χ(µ(f (s∗))) > χ(π(s)).χ(µ(g(s))), and since χ is order-preserving, for these
couples both π(s) and µ(g(s))) must be strictly lower than b.
It is easy to check that for having χ(π(s∗)).χ(µ(f (s∗))) > χ(π(s)).χ(µ(g(s))) for all
s, g must be dominated point-wise by the act g∗ (i.e., ∀s ∈ S,µ(g(s)) µ(g∗(s))) defined
as follows (this g∗ is the less favorable act that satisfies the hypothesis):
∀s ∈ A1 =
{
s,π(s) < a
}
, g∗(s) = x,
∀s ∈ A2 =
{
s,π(s) = a}, µ(g∗(s))= b−,
∀s ∈ A3 =
{
s, a < π(s) < b
}
, µ
(
g∗(s)
)= a,
∀s ∈ A4 =
{
s,π(s) b
}
, µ
(
g∗(s)
)= a−,
where a− and b− are respectively the levels in Lµ = L just below a and b (recall that the
assumption Lπ ⊆ Lµ = L is made without any loss of generality).
Let us show that χ(a).χ(b) > EU(g∗), and thus that f 	EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ g for any g satis-
fying the left hand part of the implication. First notice that
EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(g∗) =
∑
s∈A1
χ
(
π(s)
) · χ(1L)+ ∑
s∈A2
χ(a) · χ(b−)+
∑
s∈A3
χ
(
π(s)
) · χ(a)
+
∑
s∈A4
χ
(
π(s)
) · χ(a−).
Let na = |A2|. Since χ(b) > N.χ(b−), we have:
χ(a).χ(b) > na.χ(a).χ(b
−)+ χ(a).χ(b−)+ (N − na − 1).χ(a).χ(b−).
If na > 0, there exists sa such that π(sa) = a. Let us also consider xb− and xa−such that
µ(xb−) = b− and µ(xa−) = a− (they exist since Lµ = L).
Let us now consider acts xb−{sa}x⊥ and xA1(xa−A4x⊥). UOPT(xb−{sa}x⊥) = a >
UOPT(x(A1xa−A4x⊥)) = a−.
By the refinement property, EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(xb−{sa}x⊥) > EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(xA1xa−A4x⊥),
that is:
χ(a) · χ(b−) >
∑
s∈A1
χ
(
π(s)
) · χ(1L)+ ∑
s∈A4
χ
(
π(s)
) · χ(a−).
Moreover, |A3| = N − na − 1 and ∀s ∈ A3, χ(π(s)) χ(b−), so
(N − na − 1) · χ(a) · χ(b−)
∑
s∈A3
χ
(
π(s)
) · χ(a).
So, overall, na.χ(a).χ(b−)+ χ(a).χ(b−)+ (N − na − 1).χ(a).χ(b−) > EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(g∗)
and
χ(a) · χ(b) > N · χ(a) · χ(b−) > EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(g∗).
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π(s∗) = b. Then,
EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(g∗) =
∑
s∈A1
χ
(
π(s)
) · χ(1L)+ ∑
s∈A3
χ
(
π(s)
) · χ(a)
+
∑
s∈A4
χ
(
π(s)
) · χ(a−).
Let b′ = maxs,π(s)<b π(s) and sb′/π(sb′) = b′.
• First, if b′ > a−,∀s ∈ A1, xa{sb′ }x⊥ 	OPT x{s}x⊥, so, by refinement, χ(a) · χ(b′) >
χ(π(s)) · χ(1L). In the same way, ∀s ∈ A4, χ(a) · χ(b′) > χ(π(s)) · χ(a−).
So, finally,
χ(a) · χ(b) > N · χ(a) · χ(b−) > EUχ◦π,χ◦µ(g∗).
• If now b′  a. This means that A3 = ∅ in addition to A2 = ∅ (since na = 0). But then,
it is easily checked that UOPT(g∗) < a = UOPT(f ), from which, by the refinement
property, we get the desired result. 
Now let us enter the main part of the proof. Consider two acts f and g and two
transformations χ1 and χ2 satisfying H′. By Lemma A.1 then ∀c, d, c′, d ′χ1(c) · χ1(d)
χ1(c′) · χ1(d ′) ⇔ χ2(c) · χ2(d) χ2(c′) · χ2(d ′).
Consider the state s1 that maximizes χ1(π(s)).χ1(µ(f (s))) and s2 that maximizes
χ1(π(s)).χ1(µ(g(s))).
If χ1(π(s1)).χ1(µ(f (s1))) > χ1(π(s2)).χ1(µ(g(s2))), it is also the case using χ2 and
Lemma A.2 implies that f 	EU,χ1◦π,χ1◦µ g and f 	EU,χ2◦π,χ2◦µ g.
Similarly, if χ1(π(s2)).χ1(µ(g(s2))) > χ1(π(s1)).χ1(µ(f (s1))), we get g 	EU,χ1◦π,χ1◦µ
f and g 	EU,χ2◦π,χ2◦µ f .
If χ1(π(s2)).χ1(µ(g(s2))) = χ1(π(s1)).χ1(µ(f (s1))), then consider the acts f ′ =
x⊥{s1}f and g′ = x⊥{s2}g: whatever χ , f EU,χ1◦π,χ1◦µ g iff f ′ EU,χ1◦π,χ1◦µ g′ (thanks
to the STP).
The proof then goes down recursively until a strict preference is detected (and in this
case, it applies to both EU,χ1◦π,χ1◦µ and EU,χ2◦π,χ2◦µ simultaneously) or f = g = x⊥
(and in this case, the two acts share the same expected utility whatever the transformation
applied) 
Proof of Proposition 11. The proof is similar to the one of Proposition 10, except for the
Lemma A.2 that must be replaced by the following:
Lemma A.3. If CT is not satisfied, then for any unbiased and optimistic transformation χ
of L refining OPT,π,µ, it holds that:
If ∃s∗ such that ∀s,χ(π(s∗)).χ(µ(f (s∗)))> χ(π(s)).χ(µ(g(s)))
then f 	EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ g.
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∀c > c− ∈ Lµ, χ(c) > maxαk∈Lπ\{0L}nαk .χ(c−).
Indeed, let α be the positive level in Lπ that contains the greatest number of states and
consider A = {s,π(s) = α}, which is obviously a set of equi-plausible states. Let sα ∈ A, xc
be a consequence of utility c and xc− be a consequence of utility c− and build the acts f =
xc{sα}x⊥ and g = xc−Ax⊥. Obviously, f 	maximax,A g. So, the optimism of EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ
implies that χ(α).χ(c) > nαχ(α).χ(c−). So, since α is positive, χ(c) > nαχ(c−).
Let us enter the proof of the lemma and denote a = min(π(s∗),µ(f (s∗)) and b =
max(π(s∗),µ(f (s∗)). a and b are necessarily not equal to 0L (otherwise, the left part
of the implication cannot be satisfied).
Now, notice that the requirement of unbiased refinement implies that χ(b).χ(b+) >∑
s,π(s)b χ(π(s)).χ(b
−)+∑s,π(s)<b χ(π(s)).χ(1L), where b+ = mins,π(s)>bπ(s).
Multiplying by χ(a) and dividing by χ(b+) we get: χ(a).χ(b) > T 1 + T 2 where
T 1 =
∑
s,π(s)<b
χ(a).χ
(
π(s)
)
.χ(1L).
1
χ(b+)
and
T 2 =
∑
s,π(s)b
χ(a).χ
(
π(s)
)
.χ(b−) 1
χ(b+)
.
On the one hand, since χ(1L) χ(b+), we have:
χ(a).χ
(
π(s)
)
.χ(1L).
1
χ(b+)
 χ(a).χ
(
π(s)
)
.
Thus
T 1
∑
s,π(s)<b
χ(a).χ
(
π(s)
)
,
which implies that:
T 1
∑
s,a<π(s)<b
χ(a).χ
(
π(s)
)+ na.χ(a).χ(a).
Since
na.χ(a).χ(a)
∑
s,π(s)<a
χ
(
π(s)
)
.χ(1L)+
∑
s,π(s)b
χ
(
π(s)
)
.χ(a−)
(refinement property), we get:
T 1
∑
s,a<π(s)<b
χ(a).χ
(
π(s)
)+ ∑
s,π(s)<a
χ
(
π(s)
)
.χ(1L)
+
∑
χ
(
π(s)
)
.χ(a−).s,π(s)b
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1L. So:
T 2 =
∑
s,π(s)b
χ(a).χ
(
π(s)
)
.χ(b−) 1
χ(b+)
 n1L.χ(a).χ(1L).χ(b−)
1
χ(b+)
.
• If b+ < 1L, the condition of optimism implies that χ(1L) > na.χ(b+). Thus
χ(a).χ(b−).χ(1L) 1χ(b+) > na.χ(a).χ(b
−). So, T 2 > na.χ(a).χ(b−).
• If b+ = 1L, T 2 = n1L.χ(a).χ(b−). As soon as n1L  na , it holds that T 2 >
naχ(a).χ(b
−).
In summary,
χ(a).χ(b) > na.χ(a).χ(b
−)+
∑
s,a<π(s)<b
χ(a).χ
(
π(s)
)
+
∑
s,π(s)<a
χ
(
π(s)
)
.χ(1L)+
∑
s,π(s)b
χ
(
π(s)
)
.χ(a−)
provided that n1L  na or that b+ < 1, i.e., that CT does not hold.
This proves the lemma.
The proof of Proposition 11 now follows the line of that of Proposition 10. 
Proof of Theorem 1.
• The function χ∗ defined in Proposition 8 is an order-preserving transformation of
L w.r.t. π . It obeys H, as shown in Proposition 8. So, thanks to Proposition 7,
EU,χ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ refines OPT,π,µ. It is also robust, since it satisfies H′.
To show that EU,χ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ is optimistic, consider any acts f,g, any set A of equi-
plausible states such that f >maximax,A g. So, ∃s∗ ∈ A,∀s ∈ A,µ(f (s∗)) > µ(g(s)).
Now,
EUχ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ(fAx⊥) =
∑
s∈A
χ∗ ◦ π(s) · χ∗ ◦µ(f (s))
 χ∗ ◦ π(s∗) · χ∗ ◦µ(f (s∗)).
In the same way, if s′ is so that µ(g(s′)) µ(g(s)) for all s ∈ A,
EUχ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ(gAx⊥) =
∑
s∈A
χ∗ ◦ π(s) · χ∗ ◦µ(g(s))
 Card(A) · χ∗ ◦ π(s′) · χ∗ ◦µ(g(s′)).
Now, since χ∗ is unbiased and satisfies H, and since µ(f (s∗)) > µ(g(s′)), we have
χ∗ ◦ µ(f (s∗)) > N · χ∗ ◦ µ(g(s′)), from which we get fAx⊥ 	EU,χ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ gAx⊥,
since A is a set of equi-plausible states.
• By Proposition 4 for any unbiased refinement EU,p,u of the optimistic utility, there
exists a probabilistic transformation χ and an order-preserving mapping ψ such that
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a probabilistic transformation χ such that EU,p,u ≡EU,χ◦π,χ◦µ. The second item is
then a simple reformulation of Proposition 11. 
Proof of Proposition 12.
f PES,π,µ g
⇔ min
s∈S max
(
n
(
π(s)
)
,µ
(
f (s)
))
min
s∈S max
(
n
(
π(s)
)
,µ
(
g(s)
))
⇔ n(min
s∈S max
(
n
(
π(s)
)
,µ
(
g(s)
)))
 n
(
min
s∈S max
(
n
(
π(s)
)
,µ
(
f (s)
)))
⇔ max
s∈S n
(
max
(
n
(
π(s)
)
,µ
(
g(s)
)))
max
s∈S n
(
max
(
n
(
π(s)
)
,µ
(
f (s)
)))
⇔ max
s∈S min
(
n
(
n
(
π(s))
)
, n
(
µ
(
g(s)
)))
max
s∈S min
(
n
(
n
(
π(s)
))
, n
(
µ
(
f (s)
)))
⇔ max
s∈S min
(
π(s), n ◦µ(g(s)))max
s∈S min
(
π(s), n ◦µ(f (s)))
⇔ g OPT,π,n◦µ f. 
Proof of Proposition 13. First, notice that since ∀f,EUp,u¯(f ) = u(x) − EUp,u(f ) we
have ∀f,g,f EU,p,u g ⇔ g EU,p,u¯ f .
Now, from Proposition 12 we also have ∀f,g,f OPT,π,µ g ⇔ g PES,π,n◦µ f .
• Let EU,p,u be a refinement of OPT,π,µ and consider any pair f,g such that
f 	PES,π,n◦µ g. Then, from Proposition 12, g 	OPT,π,µ f and thus g 	EU,p,u f ,
which also writes f 	EU,p,u¯ g. So, 	EU,p,u¯ refines 	PES,π,n◦µ.
On the other hand, let EU,p,u¯ be a refinement of PES,π,n◦µ and consider any pair f,g
such that f 	OPT,π,µ g. From Proposition 12, g 	PES,π,n◦µ f and thus g 	EU,p,u¯ f ,
which also writes f 	EU,p,u g. So, 	EU,p,u refines 	OPT,π,µ.
• EU,p,u is optimistic iff ∀A ⊆ S set of equi-plausible states,
f 	EU,p,u,maximax,A g ⇒ fAx⊥ 	EU,p,u gAx⊥.
But, f 	EU,p,u,maximax,A g writes ∃s∗/u(f (s∗)) > u(g(s)),∀s. But this is equivalent
to ∃s∗/u(x) − u(g(s)) > u(x) − u(f (s∗)),∀s, that is ∃s∗/u¯(g(s)) > u¯(f (s∗)),∀s,
or g 	EU,p,u¯,maximin,A f .
On the other hand, fAx⊥ 	EU,p,u gAx⊥ ⇔ gAx⊥ 	EU,p,u¯ f Ax⊥, and due to the STP,
gAx⊥ 	EU,p,u¯ f Ax⊥ ⇔ gAx 	EU,p,u¯ f Ax.
So, finally, [f 	EU,p,u,maximax,A g ⇒ fAx⊥ 	EU,p,u gAx⊥] ⇔ [g 	EU,p,u¯,maximin,A
f ⇒ gAx 	EU,p,u¯ f Ax]. Which means that EU,p,u is optimistic iff EU,p,u¯ is
pessimistic.
• We show now that EU,p,u is an unbiased refinement of OPT,π,µ if and only if
EU,p,u¯ is an unbiased refinement of PES,π,n◦µ.
In other words, we have to show that:
OPT,π,µ ≡EU,p,u over LOPT ⇔ PES,π,µ′ ≡EU,p,u¯ over L′PES,
where µ′ = n ◦µ and L′PES = {x′⊥{s}x′}s∈S ∪ {x{s}x′}x∈X , where µ′(x′⊥) = 0L and
µ′(x′ ) = 1L.
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Now, remember that:
– ∀f,g,f OPT,π,µ g ⇔ g PES,π,n◦µ f (Proposition 12),
– ∀f,g,f EU,p,u g ⇔ g EU,p,u¯ f .
So, obviously, OPT,π,µ ≡EU,p,u over LOPT if and only if PES,π,µ′ ≡EU,p,u¯
over L′PES. 
Proof of Theorem 2.
• Let χ∗ be such that EU,χ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ refines OPT,π,µ. Its existence is guaranteed from
Theorem 1. Then, from Proposition 13, letting p = χ∗ ◦π and u′ = ψ∗ ◦µ = χ∗(1L)−
χ∗ ◦ n ◦µ, we get that EU,p,u′ refines PES,π,µ. furthermore, EU,p,u′ can be shown
to be robust and optimistic, in the sense of Theorem 1.
• The second item of Theorem 2 is a direct consequence of the second item of Theorem
1 and of Proposition 13. 
Proof of Proposition 14. For any complete preorder  on (LM)N , let u(,i) (resp. v(,i))
be the ith biggest sub-vector of u (resp. v) according to .
(i) Reflexivity, transitivity and completeness are consequences of the reflexivity, transi-
tivity and completeness of lmin and lmax.
(ii) u 	maxmin v ⇒ u(lmin,1) 	 v(lmin,1) ⇒ u 	lmax(lmin) v.
(iii) u lmax(lmin) v ⇔ (∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, u(lmin,j) ∼= v(lmin,j) or ∃i s.t. ∀j < i,u(lmin,j)∼= v(lmin,j) and u(lmin,i) 	lmin v(lmin,i)).
If N = 1 it can be rewritten: u lmax(lmin) v ⇔ u(lmin,1) ∼= vlmin(,1) or u(lmin,1) 	lmin
v(lmin,1)) ⇔ u(lmin,1) lmin v(lmin,1)) with u(lmin,1) = u and v(lmin,1) = v, that is
u lmin v.
(iv) Now, If M = 1, we have ∀j = 1, . . . ,N,u(lmin,j) = u(j) and v(lmin,j) = v(j). So,
u lmax(lmin) v ⇔ (∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, u(j) = v(j) or ∃i s.t. ∀j < i,u(j) = v(j) and
u(i) > v(i)), which is the definition of lmax. 
Proof of Proposition 15. Just notice that f OPT,π,µ g ⇔ f maxmin g, where fi,1 =
gi,1 = π(si) and fi,2 = µ(f (si)) and gi,2 = µ(g(si)),∀i = 1, . . . , |S|. So, obviously since
lmax(lmin) refines maxmin from Proposition 14(ii), it refines OPT,π,µ as a preordering
over acts. 
Proof of Proposition 16. First, we show that lmin(lmax) refines minmax: u 	minmax v ⇒
u(lmax,|S|) 	 v(lmax,|S|) ⇒ u 	lmin(lmax) v.
Now, f 	PES,π,µ g ⇔ n(g) 	minmax n(f ) ⇒ n(g) 	lmin(lmax) n(f ) ⇔ f 	lmin(lmax,n)
g. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Let us show that EU,χ∗◦π,χ∗◦µ is equivalent to lmax(lmin). The
proof for the pessimistic case is quite similar and is omitted.
H. Fargier, R. Sabbadin / Artificial Intelligence 164 (2005) 245–280 277First, the equivalence between lmin and EU,p∗,u∗ over the set XS of “elementary”
acts: XS = {x{s}x⊥, x ∈ X,s ∈ S,µ(x⊥) = 0L,min(π(s),µ(x)) > 0L} ⊆ XS is a byprod-
uct of Lemma A.1 (see proof of Lemma Appendix A), since χ∗ satisfies H′.
Now, let us consider the whole set of possible acts XS . We show that lmax(lmin) is
equivalent to EU,p∗,u∗ . The proof is similar to the one of Proposition 10 and relies on
Lemmas A.1 and A.2. Indeed, let {s1, . . . , sN } and {s′1, . . . , s′N } be two orderings of S such
that f (s1){s1}x⊥ lmin f (s2){s2}x⊥ lmin · · · lmin f (sN){sN }x⊥ and g(s′1){s′1}x⊥ lmin
g(s′2){s′2}x⊥ lmin · · · lmin g(s′N){s′N }x⊥ (lmin is equivalent to EU,p∗,u∗ on set of the
elementary acts). These orderings are exactly equivalent to the orderings of the sets of
products {χ∗(π(si)) · χ∗(µ(f (si)))} and {χ∗(π(s′i )) · χ∗(µ(g(s′i )))} in decreasing order
respectively (consequence of Lemma A.1). So, the preference between f and g is de-
termined, as in Proposition 10 by the comparison of the first pair of non equal products
(consequence of Lemma A.2).
This is just the definition of the lmax(lmin) comparison of f and g! 
Sketch of proof of Proposition 17. Let GH be the following generalization of H
GH ∀α,α′ ∈ L s.t. α > α′: χ(α)m > N · χ(1L)m−1 · χ(α′).
A solution of this equation is the mapping χ defined by the series χ(αi) = 1/Nmi+1 .
Notice that from GH we can deduce:
GH′ ∀α,α′ ∈ L s.t. α > α′: χ(α)(m−v) > χ(1L)m−1−v · χ(α′) for any v < m.
First, we show that for any couple of vectors A(i, .),B(j, .), A(i, .) leximin B(j, .) ⇔∏
k∈M χ(Ai,k) 
∏
k∈M χ(Bi,k). We can suppose without loss of generality, that the ele-
ments of both vectors are ranked in increasing order.
Then, consider F,G such that F lmax(lmin) G (for convenience, and without loss of
generality, we suppose that the elements and vectors are correctly ranked, i.e., in increasing
order within the vectors, and in decreasing order between the vectors). First, we show that∑
i=1,N
∏
j=1,M χ(Fi,j ) =
∑
i=1,N
∏
j=1,M χ(Gi,j ) iff F ∼lmax(lmin) G, and then that
F 	lmax(lmin) G implies ∑j∈N ∏k∈M χ(Fj,k) >∑j∈N ∏k∈M χ(Gj,k), from which we
get the equivalence of both relations. 
Proof of Proposition 18. As said in the text, it is a trivial consequence of Proposition 14
(in the case where N = 1), that states that lmin refines min: 
Proof of Proposition 19. First, let {s1, . . . , sN } and {s′1, . . . , s′N } be such that κ(s1) +
µ(f (s1)) . . . κ(sN )+µ(f (sN)) and κ(s′1)+µ(f (s′1)) . . . κ(s′N)+µ(f (s′N)). Let now
βi = κ(si)+µ(f (si)) and β ′i = κ(s′i )+µ(f (s′i )),∀i.
Now the proof is twofold:
(⇒) f Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ g ⇔ ∃j/∀i < j,βi = β ′i and βj < β ′j . Since βj < β ′j we have
εβj+1  εβ ′i that is ε · α · εβj  α · εβ ′j . But since ε  1/(|S| + 1), we get α · εβj  (|S| +
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kj α · εβ
′
k , which in turn implies
∑
kj α · εβk >
∑
kj α · εβ
′
k
. Finally,
∑
s∈S
α · εκ(s) · εµ(f (s)) >
∑
s∈S
α · εκ(s) · εµ(g(s)).
That is f 	EU,pε,uε g.
(⇐) Now, let f 	EU,pε,uε g. This is equivalent to∑
k=1..N
α · εβk >
∑
k=1..N
α · εβ ′k . (a)
Let now j be such that βi = β ′i ,∀i < j and βj = β ′j .
(a) ⇔ α · εβj +
∑
k>j
α · εβk > α · εβ ′j +
∑
k>j
α · εβ ′k .
Now, if we assume βj > β ′j , then εβj  ε · εβ
′
j , which implies εβ
′
j  (1/ε) · α · εβj >
α · εβj +∑k>j α · εβk which is in contradiction with (a).
So, βj  β ′j and since they are different, βj < β ′j . This entails the result, i.e., {κ(s) +
µ(f (s))}s∈S ≺lmin {κ(s)+µ(g(s))}s∈S , i.e., f 	Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ g. 
Proof of Proposition 20. First, note that for any OMEU preference relation OMEU,κ,µ
there exists an unbiased EU-refinement in the sense of Definition 22: the one described in
Proposition 19. Indeed, EUp,u(x{s}x⊥) = α · εκ({s}) · εµ(x) = α · εOMEUκ,µ(x{s}x⊥), a strictly
decreasing function of OMEUκ,µ(x{s}x⊥).
Now, let us show that for any unbiased refinement of OMEU,κ,µ, EU,p,u, we have
EU,p,u ≡Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ.
First, notice that if EU,p,u is an unbiased refinement of OMEU,κ,µ, then: ∀s, s′, x, x′,
p(s) · u(x) p(s′) · u(x′) ⇔ κ(s) + µ(x) κ(s′) + µ(x′) (just write the OMEU and the
expected utility of two elementary acts f = x{s}x⊥ and g = x′{s′}x⊥).
Then, note that
f 	EU,p,u g ⇔
∑
s∈S
p(s) · u(f (s))>∑
s∈S
p(s) · u(g(s))
and
f 	Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ g ⇔
{
κ(s) +µ(f (s))}
s∈S ≺lmin
{
κ(s) +µ(g(s))}
s∈S.
Since EU,p,u is a unbiased refinement of OMEU,κ,µ, we have for all f,g, s, s′: p(s) ·
u(f (s)) p(s) · u(g(s)) ⇔ κ(s) +µ(f (s)) κ(s) +µ(g(s)).
So, there exist two orderings of S: {s1, . . . , sN } and {s′1, . . . , s′N } such that:
κ(s1)+µ
(
f (s1)
)
 · · · κ(sN)+µ
(
f (sN)
)
and
p(s1) · u
(
f (s1)
)
 · · · p(sN) · u
(
f (sN)
)
,
κ(s′1)+µ
(
g(s′1)
)
 · · · κ(s′N)+µ
(
g(s′N)
)
and
p(s′1) · u
(
g(s′1)
)
 · · · p(s′N) · u
(
g(s′N)
)
.
H. Fargier, R. Sabbadin / Artificial Intelligence 164 (2005) 245–280 279Assume now f 	EU,p,u g. We have f OMEU,κ,µ g, since EU,p,u refines OMEU,κ,µ. Let
j/∀i < j, κ(si)+µ(f (si)) = κ(s′i )+µ(g(s′i )) and κ(sj )+µ(f (sj )) = κ(s′j )+µ(g(s′j )).
Such j exists since if not we would get f ∼EU,p,u g. Now, since for i < j,p(si) ·
u(f (si)) = p(s′i ) · u(g(s′i )), f 	EU,p,u g ⇔ f ′ 	EU,p,u g′, where f ′ = x⊥{s1, . . . , sj−1}f
and g′ = x⊥{s′1, . . . , s′j−1}g. But this implies f ′ OMEU,κ,µ g′ (refinement), so that
κ(sj ) + µ(f (sj ))  κ(s′j ) + µ(g(s′j )). But since these last two terms are different, we
have κ(sj ) + µ(f (sj )) < κ(s′j ) + µ(g(s′j )), i.e., f ′ 	Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ g′, from which we get
f 	Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ g. Finally, f 	EU,p,u g ⇒ f 	Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ g.
Now, we prove the converse implication. First, notice that f 	Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ g ⇒
f ′ 	OMEU,κ,µ g′ where f ′ and g′ are defined as before. Since EU,p,u refines OMEU,κ,µ,
we get f ′ 	EU,p,u g′, which is equivalent to f 	EU,p,u g.
So, 	Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ ≡	EU,p,u, i.e., Lexi-OMEU,κ,µ ≡EU,p,u . 
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